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Abstract
The effectiveness of periodical payment for forested lands as an incentive system to stop a conversion of forested 
lands is analyzed. Four simple models are outlined and analyzed to investigate behavior of the land manager 
whether to maintain the lands remain forested or to convert them to other uses. The  analysis is pure theoretical 
employing the optimal con- trol theory.  A key element to induce the land manager to adopt forest conservation rather 
than forest conversion is a combination of periodical payments for the forested lands and the desirable scrap value. 
Without the desirable scrap value, periodical payments of carbon stock, regardless of the tariff, cannot stop the 
conversion; the tariff affects only the time when the conversion will be  conducted but it is not sufficient to induce the 
land manager not to convert the forested lands. On the basis of this analysis, then policy implication is outlined. In 
order to provide the desirable scrap value, then a policy change is required. However, its implementation very likely 
encounters serious challenges from the land manager.
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Introduction
The aim of REDD+ is to encourage developing countries 
to contribute to climate change mitigation efforts by: i) 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by slowing, 
halting and reversing forest loss and degradation; and ii) 
increasing removal of GHGs from  the earth's atmosphere 
through the conservation, management and ex-pansion of 
1   
forests. I have  a problem with this kind of approach because 
once a forest has achieved its maximum stock the land on 
which the forest grows becomes a warehouse for merely 
storing carbon. Whereas there are so many places that prac- 
tically cannot produce biomass at all, such as desert 
(Table  1). These kind of places are more suitable for 
warehousing the global carbon stock, while the tropical 
forests are more suitable for producing biomass containing 
the carbon.  In order for the tropical forests to keep on 
producing the biomass, the forests must be harvested 
regularly instead of being kept at their maximum carbon 
stock. Conversely, preventing the tropical forests from being 
touched could be wasting the most productive ma- chine for 
capturing carbon.
 Unfortunately, conserving the tropical forests is very 
complicated.  Most tropical forests are located in developing 
countries, such Brazil, Congo, and Indonesia, where 
economically majority of the people relies on land-based 
activities for their livelihood. Forest degradation and 
deforestation are very rampant.  Recently, oil palm plantation 
have  frequently been blamed as a major driver of tropical 
deforestation (Busch et al. 2015; Carlson et al. 2018; 
Fitzherbert et al. 2008; Tata et al. 2014; Vijay et al. 2016; 
Wilcove & Koh 2010).  However, it would be wiser  to look 
at the forest itself rather than to blame other land uses, such as 
oil palm plantation, if they are more profitable economically. 
Even more ridiculous, there are  educated groups of people 
who care  more about orangutans than real people.
 In 2005, The United Nations Framework on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) agreed tostart a work program to explore 
a range of policy  approaches and positive incentives for 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) (Corbera et al. 2010).  Since then the climate 
change discussions have infused the forest arena withnew 
enthusiasm through developing the instrument of reducing 
emissions from deforestation and Forest degradation and 
conservation, sustainable use and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks, which are collectively known as REDD+ 
(Agrawal et al. 2011).   As new international conservation 
and development programs, early stage of REDD+ was 
welcomed and characterized by large  amounts of resources 
and at- tention, along with high  expectations of success that 
are rarely fulfilled (Massarella et al. 2018), including what 
happened in Indonesia.
 The objective of writing this paper is to show 
theoretically the effectiveness ofcarbon credits in stopping 
the conversion of forested lands for alternative uses. The 
carbon credits meant in this paper are periodical payment for 
the forested land and final payment for the remaining 
forested land at the end of the contract. Certainly, this scheme 
of the payments may  be considered as one form  of REDD+.  
In this paper,  I would like to signify that a periodical 
payment for forested lands is not sufficient to stop forest 
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conversion, regardless of the tariff paid. This periodical 
payment needs to be combined with the scrap value  of the 
forested lands. In general, as suggested by Morel and Morel 
(2012), in order for carbon credits awarded for reducing 
emissions from  deforestation and degradation of forests 
(REDD) to be effective, they need to be competitive with 
alternative land uses. Unfortunately, converting a hectare of 
forest for palm oil production will be more profitable to 
landowners than preserving it for carbon credits (Butler et al. 
2009).
2    Situation Scenario
 There are  uniform y units of land covered fully by 
0  
natural forest. The  land is owned by the state. To derive 
benefit from  the land, the government transfers the land to a 
company to be utilized for whatever the company wants to 
do; the company is allowed to convert the land for alternative 
uses or to keep the land remains forested.  The  time period of 
the contract is T.  In each period, the forested lands are given 
periodical payment as much as w  per  unit per  period. The  
discount rate employed is r . At the end of the contract, the 
land manager can sell the remaining forested lands for S (y 
(T), T).
 If a conversion is chosen, the cost of the conversion is c 
per unit that delivers the benefit of p per unit. The  conversion 
rate at period t is x(t) and the maximum conversion rate 
allowed is x unit per period. The objective of the land 
manager is to maximize the net present value of the stream 
net benefits and the scrap value. We will investigate the 
behavior of the land manager in achieving this objective.
3 Model Analysis
In this section, four combinations between periodical 
payments and scrap value will be analyzed, namely without 
scrap value and without periodical payments, without scrap 
value  with periodical payments, with scrap value  and 
without periodical payments, and with scrap value  and with 
periodical payments.
3.1 Without Scrap Value
 The  forested lands left over  at the end of the 
concession period have  no value. Intuitively, the land 
manager has no incentive to maintain the lands remain 
forested until the end of the concession period.
 3.1.1Without Periodical Payment on the Forested 
Lands
    The problem of the land manager may be formulated 
as follows:
                         [1]
        
        [2]
        
        [3]
 Hamiltonian of this problem is:
        [4]
 where λ(t ) is the costate variable.
 Since the Hamiltonian is linear in the control variable 
x(t), then we have  a bang- bang solution as follows:
       
        [5]
∗ 
It indicates that the optimal conversion rate x(t ) is 
dependent on the costate vari- able  λ(t ). Our task now is 
to find out the motion of the costate variable. The deriva- 
tive of the Equation [4] with respect to y (t ) is
        [6]
 Since the Hamiltonian has no state variable, then the 
solution for Equation [6] is:
        [7]
 where λ(0) = λ .
0 
 Since the transversality condition is λ(T) = 0, then λ = 
0 
0 implying that λ(t ) = 0 for all t . The Equation (5) may be 
simplified as
        [8]
 If p > c , then the conversion occurs since very 
beginning. On the contrary, if p < c , then the conversion 
will never be conducted.
 3.1.2 With Periodical Payment on the Forested Lands
 Let us assume that each unit of natural forest intact is 
awarded by w. The prob- lem of the forest manager 
becomes
        [9]
      [10]
 y(0) = y and      y(T)       free                                [11]
0          
 Hamiltionian for this problem is as follows:
      [12]
 Bang-bang solution:
      
      [13]
The motion of the costate variable is governed by the 
following Equation
      [14]
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Ecosystem
 
Net Aboveground Primary 
Production
 
(kJ m2
 
yr-1)
 
Biomass
 
(kJ m2)
 
 
Desert
 
1,686
 
4
 
Tundra
 
1,075
 
2
 
Temperate grassland
 
4,941
 
4
 
Tropical grassland
 
11,272
 
34
 
Temperate forest 21,055  5
 
Tropical forest
 
22,589
 
70
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Table 1  Primary productivity
The general solution to this equation is
      [15]
where: k is a constant that needs to be determined to find 
out the definite solution.Since the transversality 
condition is λ(T) = 0, then               as a result the definite 
solution for λ(t ).
      [16]
The      determines the path level of λ(t ). For a given r, the 
smaller the w, the lower the λ(t ).  Figure 1 presents the 
λ(t) path for different level of    .   If p − c ≥ λ(t ) for all t, 
then the conversion occurs since very beginning. 
However, if p − c < λ(t ) for some t  and p − c ≥ λ(t ) for 
some other t , then the conversion timing will be delayed 
but the conversion itself cannot be avoided. The 
conversion will occur when the shadow price curve of the 
natural forest intact crosses the p − c curve from  above.
 The path of the forested land stock is dependent on the 
maximum conversion rate allowed. If the maximum 
conversion rate is very high,  then the natural forests will 
be liquidated totally before T. If the maximum conversion 
rate is too low, however, then the natural forests will not 
be liquidated fully at time T.
3.2    With Scrap Value
The forested lands left over at the end of the concession 
period have  a value. The value  should be sufficient to induce 
the land manager to adopt a conservation strat- egy rather 
than a conversion strategy. Intuitively, the land manager has 
the incentive to maintain the lands remain forested until the 
end of the concession period if the scrap value  is desired.  Let 
S(y, T) denote the salvage value  of the natural forests at the 
end of the contract.
3.2.1 Without periodical payment on the forested 
lands
 The objective of the land manager is
      [17]
with constraints
      [18]
y(0) = y and      y (T)        free                                [19]
0          
 Hamiltonian of this problem is
H = [p x(t ) − c x(t )] − λ(t )x(t )                                     [20]
 This  case  has  a similar solution for  the control 
variable as  the first case  (Equation [5]). In addition, the 
general solution for the costate variable is also similar as 
shown in Equation [7]. To establish the definite solution 
for the costate variable, however, we have  to rely on a 
different transversality condition.  The  transversality 
condition required here is λ(T)                  (Sethi & 
Thompson 2000). Asuming that S(y,t) = ϕy (T), then λ(T) 
−r T 
= e ϕ.  Furthermore, the definite solution for the shadow 
price of the natural forest is 
      [21]
Taking a derivative of Equation (21) with respect to t 
yields
      [22]
λ(t) It indicates that Equation [21] is increasing in t 
(Figure 2).  Moreover, if ϕ ≤ p − c , then the conversion 
occurs since very beginning due  to λ(t ) < (p − c ) for t < T. 
Two interesting cases may  emerge when ϕ > p−c, namely 
λ(t ) that never cross p−c for all t (the top curve), which is 
very unlikely to materialize, and λ(t ) that crosses p−c at a 
particular t , say  t (the middle curve). In the first case, the 
1  
conversion never occur, while  in the second case, the 
conversion is initially done but finally stopped at t when 
1 
λ(t ) = p−c .
1 
3.2.2 With periodical payment on the forested lands
 This  is the last combination analyzed in this paper.  
The  problem of the land manager may  be formulated as 
follows:
      
      [23]
      
      [24]
y (0) = y and      y (T)        free              [25]
0          
Hamiltonian of this problem is      
H = [p x(t ) − c x(t )+wy(t)] − λ(t )x(t )              [26]
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Figure 1 Timing of the conversion.
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converting the land, (p − c).   When the shadow price of the 
forested land crosses the net benefit from the conversion, 
then the conversion starts realizing until the contract ends. 
The periodical payments can postpone the starting point of 
the conversion but cannot eliminate completely the 
possibility of the conversion itself regardless of the tariff 
(Figure 1).   Meanwhile, scrap value is theoretically able to 
eliminate completely the possibility of the conversion, but 
the value required is unrealistically too high (Figure 2). 
Hence, the most probable approach to eliminating totally the 
possibility of the conversion with more realistic scrap value 
is a combination between the periodical payments and scrap 
value (Figure 3). Certainly, it is not an easy task to 
accomplish.
 The meaning of the conversion may be relaxed to include 
any exploitation of the forested lands such that the forest 
stock does not meet the minimum stock required to obtain the 
periodical payments as well as to have scrap value. This 
relaxation allows us to analyze the behavior of the forest 
concession holders and certainly makes the model more 
realistic in reflecting the real world. Until today, the 
concession holders are facing uncertainty regarding the 
renewal of their concession.  As consequence, the 
concession holders are reluctant to make long term 
investments to improve the stock of the forest under their 
concession. A salvage value to some degree is able to lessen 
the effect of uncertainties regarding the permit renewal. 
Scrap value can provide incentives for the concession 
holders to apply their creativity and capacity in improving 
the forested lands they manage. To adopt scrap value, 
however, the government needs to change the policies 
related to land concession.
 The model shows that five parameters are involved in 
determining the possibility of the conversion, namely p , c , r 
, w , and ϕ. Parameter p dan w have  a conflicting effect on the 
conservation or conversion (Fisher et al. 2014).   Girma et al. 
(2012) shows that optimal forest stock is inversely related to 
the discount rate and at discount rates higher than 5%, 
complete deforestation becomes the optimal land use choice. 
Moreover, as representation of w, (Rossi et al. 2017) 
suggests that carbon market prices are too low to be an 
incentive to change logging practices toward more climate-
smart forest management, and a change of paradigm to 
Due to linearity of the Hamiltonian in the control 
variable, then we have  bang-bang
solution:
      [27]
. 
As in Section 3.1.2,  here we have  the same form  of the 
costate variable λ(t) =            . To establish the definitive 
solution for λ(t ), we have  to figure out the value of the 
constant k by employing the transversality condition  
−r T 
which is λ(T) = e ϕ as in Section 3.2.1. So, we obtain:
      [28]
The first term of the right side of this equation is the same 
as Equation [16], which is negative sloping in t , while  
the second term is the same as Equation [21], which has a 
positive slope. The slope of Equation [28] is certainly 
dependent on which one of the two terms is stronger or 
weaker. Taking a derivative of Equation [28] with respect 
to t yields:
     [29]
−r (2T−t ) −r (T−t ) 
We know that e < e for all t , while  r is less than 
1.  Hence, for ϕ that is close  to w , Equation (29) will be 
negative. Theoretically, it can be positive if ϕ is away  
bigger than w , which is not realistic in the real  world.  
For  practical reason, therefore, I assume that Equation 
[29] is negative. In other words, Equation [28] is 
downward sloping in t as long as ϕ is close  to w .
 Figure 3 presents three levels  of scrap value. The  
bottom curve represents no scrap value  and the 
conversion occurs at t as  previously obtained.  The  
1  
middle curve indicates periodical  payment 
complemented with insufficient scrap value, so that the 
conversion still occur although it is little bit delayed to t . 
2 
Finally, the top curve shows periodical payment 
complemented with sufficient scrap value, so that the 
conversion does not occur.
 Discussion and Policy Implication
 The conversion does not occur so long the shadow price 
of the forested land, λ(t ), is higher than the net benefit from  
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Figure 2 Relationship between unit scrap value and 
conversion timing.
Figure 3 Conversion timing (above) and dynamics of the natural 
forest intact (bottom)
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change actors' behaviors would be needed.  In addition, using 
contingent evaluation in Vietnam, Nielsen et al. (2018) 
shows that Willing To Accept (WTA) compensation for 
entering into contracts requiring farmers to refrain from  
-1 -
cutting indigenous hardwood trees is 387–594 USD ha year
1
. 
 In the case of Indonesian natural forest utilization, the 
implementation of the scrap value of natural forest 
concession must be preceded by adjustment in the licensing 
tariff and enforcement of the performance guarantee fund 
that is mandated in the Law 41 of 1999. It would be extremely 
ridiculous when the concession holders can have scrap value 
at the end of the contract while they have  paid very low for 
the concessionary areas and have  not put any deposit as the 
performance guarantee. Meanwhile, the periodical payments 
potentially reduce the harvest rate of timber that determines 
the revenue of the government. By and large, the 
implementation of the periodical payments for forested lands 
and scrap value requires changes in policy. In short, I believe 
that the conversion of forested lands is very likely and very 
hard to stop. However, hopes do not totally go away (Aziz et 
al. 2015; Persson 2012; Rakatama et al. 2018; Strassburg et 
al. 2009).
Conclusion
 A conversion of forested land to alternative uses will not 
occur as long as the shadow price of the forested land is 
higher than the net benefit from the conversion. Periodical 
payments alone without scrap value  will not be able  to 
eliminate totally the possibilities of the conversion. Scrap 
value  alone is theoretically can provide an incentive for 
keeping lands remain forested but the magnitude will be 
unrealistically too high.  A combination of periodical 
payments and scrap value provide the most probable 
opportunity for totally avoiding conversion of forested lands. 
However, it is not a sufficient combination since the 
magnitude of the payments and scrap value matters.
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